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Abstract 
The reification of social and technological “Destiny” has been rigorously investigated by critical theorists. This paper dovetails 
this largely Western tradition with notions of Japanese subjectivity to investigate the annihilation of dialogic relations in 
asynchronous online learning. As suggested by the two Japanese characters for “human being” (“person” and “space” [Ma]), 
subjectivity is always contextual and unstable. Ma unhinges assumptions about selfhood and modular online learning to reveal 
how the disconnect between fixed “selves” and Learning Objects masks the flux of subjectivity and creates a flattened 
Eurocentric (k)nowhere.  
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1. Introduction 
Critical theory tackles Marx’s exhortation that “All that is solid melts into air” to insist that knowledge is never 
ideologically neutral: it is socially grounded, embedded in history and always political. European intellectuals such 
as Barthes and Althusser have continued the seminal work of the Frankfurt School to demystify and contextualize 
human choices that too easily take reified flight as inevitable, fated or “common sense.” This unmasking of human 
agency and power relations reveals socially constructed belief systems to be contested, intricate and in flux. 
Critical theory lifts mystified mechanisms of power to the bare bulb of inquiry, generating context, complexity 
and agency. The protean quality of Japanese subjectivity offers an analogous framework from which to de-stabilize 
autonomous, firmly bounded Eurocentric notions of selfhood. Loosely speaking, the Japanese term for person 
(ningen) is a compound of human and space. The latter is called ma (gen’s alternative reading) and is a generative 
spark of interaction and being that is defoliated by the English translation “space,” which connotes an indefinite 
void. Western space masquerades as emptiness. Ma, however, blossoms the self, a vital constitutive gap where 
selves shape fleeting identities together.  
Ma is radically disruptive. The Western notion of fixed identity goes nova to become irreducibly plural. Each 
new situation / connection kindles (the interstices of) being into becoming, a chain without closure or core. As Odin 
(1995) notes, ma opens “a space-time interval whereby each object has a relatedness or between-ness with its 
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surrounding context. “ (p. 12). Ma is a dislocated absent presence that refuses any fixed anchor. Indeed, there is no 
Kantian categorical imperative in Tokyo: salarymen exchange business cards mid-bow to establish a ma that 
generates culturally appropriate responses (who has to bow lower, who uses more polite language and a myriad 
other nuanced conventions). The Japanese self cannot escape social context. Neither, of course, can the non-
Japanese self. 
It can be dangerous to exotify ma and reinscribe the “Orient” as the limit to the Western self. The so-called West 
has ma too, but does not identify it as such. Its trace is in the term corporation, from the Latin corporare (to make a 
body). Consider Levinas’ utterly relational ethics: they do not “spring from human nature or from what can be 
known; rather what exists and what can be known are effects of the subject’s radical dependence on and 
responsibility to the other” (Grosz, 1989, p. 142). What, after all, is his I-Thou relationship but an invocation of ma?  
This paper invokes the generative penumbra of ma to re-imagine the sovereign, bounded and free-standing 
Western self in order to delineate the relational quality of online learning. Since it is problematic to appropriate 
Japanese metaphysics to re-imagine Western concepts, ma is cited not as an answer but as a question to dislodge 
assumptions and lacunae. As Pilgrim notes, “Ma resides in the between-ness which is continually breaking open the 
literal, descriptive world and inviting direct experience of the inarticulate, deconstructed, ‘empty’ reality of 
immediate experience” (as cited in Odin, 1995, p. 12). Empty reality, immediate experience? This could easily be a 
poetic invocation of cyberspace. Ma is a monosyllabic lexis that critically refigures digital subjectivity and 
pedagogy. 
Marshall McLuhan’s prescient invocation of technology as global extensions of the central nervous system has 
become an empty bromide. Less well known is his injunction that this technological extension (or ma) has 
consequences and demands “new equilibriums among the other organs and extensions of the body...man in the 
normal use of his technology (or his variously extended body) is perpetually modified by it” (McLuhan, 1964, p. 
45). Ma is a luxuriant koan with which to tickle the electronically distended self.  
For those privileged enough to be online, modification (a.k.a. learning) transpires most often through an eternal 
present of YouTube memes, celebrity culture and titillation. At its most Wikitopian, Web 2.0 spawns a democratic 
digital de-institutionalization worthy of Ivan Illich: the decentralized, anarchistic open source community of nearly a 
million members freely shares expertise, labour and mentoring (Adler & Brown, 2008, p. 5). Linux and their other 
free products are often superior to commercial alternatives. This is a powerful rejoinder to the essentialization of 
competition and the marketplace, and it has spread beyond the copyleft community. For example, Harvard Law 
School made the bold move of offering a course in Second Life that anyone could attend (Graves, 2008). 
However, the collapse of the producer / consumer divide has a more sinister side. Radical egalitarianism easily 
fosters a violent annihilation of expertise. Blogs polarize public discourse; when individuals seek and reinforce the 
ideas of kindred spirits, extremism finds fertile ground. For example, an Angus Reid poll found that only 42% of 
Republicans believed that their President was a natural-born citizen (Angus Reid, 2009). Google’s algorithms do not 
parse information for validity; it is a popularity contest where Tom Cruise will always trump cruise missile, creating 
an accelerated and accelerating event horizon drunk on its own reflection. 
But can simulacral dilutions of humanity even be considered ma? As Lanier (2006) notes in “Digital Maoism,” it 
is essential yet difficult to foreground individual human thought in cyberspace: “The beauty of the Internet is that it 
connects people. The value is in the other people. If we start to believe that the Internet itself is an entity that has 
something to say, we're devaluing those people and making ourselves into idiots” (para. 26). We risk idiocy when a 
news aggregator like “Popurls” ignores medical breakthroughs to focus instead on a world ice-cream eating record 
(para. 22). Aggregation, not critical engagement with information, drives social and economic decisions. As Lanier  
notes, the trend in cyberspace is “ to remove the scent of people, so as to come as close as possible to simulating the 
appearance of content emerging out of the Web as if it were speaking to us as a supernatural oracle. This is where 
the use of the Internet crosses the line into delusion” (para. 18).  
Although no online oracle has fully replaced traditional educational models, the promise of an infinitely 
reproducible industrial “teaching product” remains attractive to many administrators as the cost of each DVD, 
webinar, podcast or digitally mediated lecture represents a huge savings. It is critical to unmask the brutal neoliberal 
rationale and the standardization, deskilling and automation that come in the wake of its exaltation of flexible and 
individualized learning. 
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Learning Object are self-contained, digitally tagged, modular and re-usable “lessons” transmitted en bloc to 
learners. In addition to offering just in time delivery, they are easily adapted to market conditions and have certainly 
been purged of the “scent of people.” Hrachovec (2006) wryly notes that “a learning object is the equivalent of a 
chunk of beef, registered according to some classificatory scheme, marked by a stamp of approval by some 
authority, deep-frozen and waiting for delivery” (p. 104). This is the prima facie example of Paulo Freire’s (1970) 
celebrated critique of the banking model of education, where teachers “deposit” ideas into students: 
 
      the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits.  
      They do, it is true, have the opportunity to become collectors or cataloguers of the things they store. But in the  
      last analysis, it is the people themselves who are filed away through the lack of creativity, transformation, and  
      knowledge in this (at best) misguided system. For apart from inquiry, apart from the praxis, individuals cannot  
      be truly human. Knowledge emerges only through invention and re-invention, through the restless, impatient,  
      continuing, hopeful inquiry human beings pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other. (p. 46)   
 
Websites, typing, search engines, podcasts: these are almost always explored alone. When put beside the rich 
tapestry of real-world interactions, held to the light of complex cultural patterns, compared to the wisdom of sensory 
intelligence and placed next to the variegated extra-linguistic rhythms of the natural world, online interactions are 
solitary pursuits. The alienated, autonomous individual is framed in cyberspace through decontextualized words, 
graphics and a limited set of menu options that demand individual interpretation. Where is the ma? From this 
perspective, doesn’t all online learning ultimately collapse into a Eurocentric (k)nowhere, with—at (synchronous) 
best—one lone homunculus connecting with other fixed, distant and solitary homunculi? 
When data take the place of wisdom and isolated individuals consume isolated Learning Objects, they spurn the 
continuous and richly nuanced open ma of the “flesh world.” The mediated non/presence of cyberspace creates what 
Pesce (1993) calls “a profound sense of disembodiment, one that in almost any other state of being would be called 
pathogenic. It is a form of electronically-mediated schizophrenia, where the self, through its various holosthetic 
extensions, removes itself from itself” (para. 30). There is, pace Gertrude Stein, no there there.    
Ma is profoundly human.  Because it is fluid, emergent and multiplicitous, ma assuages what McLuhan (1964) 
saw as lazy digital solipsism: “as long as we adopt the Narcissus attitude of regarding the extensions of our own 
bodies as really out there and really independent of us, we will meet all technological challenges with the same sort 
of banana-skin pirouette and collapse.” (p. 68). The selfless digital self represents a violent flattening of human 
experience that occludes immediacy and history. The electronic infobahn mutes difference and emotion in rigid 
simulacra that eclipse experiential evidence, sensation and intuitive logic. In short, the default of cyberspace is to 
kill ma.  
The de-centred centre of ma embraces culture, learning and identity as constructed and constructing, as organic, 
flexible and unstable, as irreducibly beyond the binomial logic of fixed points. Things become relationships vaulting 
through an inherently unstable (but preciously human) space. The dance of ma thus parallels Derrida’s différance, a  
term playfully combining "to defer" and "to differ" to indicate how words can never fully summon meaning but only 
invoke additional (different) meanings or words. Meaning is thus forever "deferred" through a never-ending 
sequence of signifiers. Ma is the transposition of this concept from language to the self: individuals can never be 
fully conscious of or present to themselves, for they are always differing and deferred. The centre is no centre at all, 
and presence is an invention hiding fluidity and displacement. 
The interstitial flux and subjectivity that flows through ma parallels the field-dependent subjectivity of oral 
culture, where the dynamics of eye contact, tone of voice, body language, thin-slicing and the rich palimpsest of 
embodied human connections spawn a subjectivity quintessentially different from that experienced by the 
alphabetized mind. Walter Ong’s seminal parsing of the literate mind delineates the violence with which literacy 
ambushes oral culture.  Ong (1988) explores how moveable type led to abstraction, science, and interiorization. 
Cyberspace, far from creating a new oral culture, metastasizes the trajectory of the alphabetized mind (even as 
literacy levels in wealthy countries continue to stagnate).  Ong calls this “secondary orality,” a post-literate grafting 
of  grapholectic consciousness onto McLuhan’s electronically drawn-out senses. Secondary orality veils the ma of 
context and sensation more than mere text does and thrusts the isolated individual perspective into overdrive. 
Genuine learning is grounded in reciprocity, in the I-Thou ma of openness and active listening. The sender-
receiver model of Learning Objects re-inscribes an instrumental world made up of atomized collections of data. The 
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struggle for humane and progressive online education follows the contours of the offline struggle between market-
driven technocrats and learning communities that embrace the transformative promise of pedagogy. These teachers 
and learners refuse trivial exhortations to be technologically cutting edge, resist standardized systems of electronic 
“deliverables” and question how ever-increasing demands for “accountability” tragically divert scarce resources. In 
light of this, the foregrounding of the interactional self (un/grounded by ma) can highlight the profoundly social 
nature of learning and thereby forge a more complex and human(e) pedagogy. 
Education is a communal dance shaped by critical cultural and personal events. Online learning denudes such 
complexities by denying the shifting and embodied nature of subjectivity. There are grave consequences in 
separating learning from a larger ecology of interaction. Cyberspace does not simply “mediate” reality. All 
technology (pace Ong, McLuhan and Illich) alters the way a mind exists and interacts in the world. Ma opens 
interstitial and social temporality. It reveals fragmented subjects continually in the process of becoming. And it 
invokes a radical unlearning of fixed Western notions of subjectivity. Ma rebukes platitudes of horror and 
redemption that surround public discourse about cyberspace, for an uncritical embrace of digital emancipation is as 
imprudent as a neo-Luddite rejection of technology. Context (or ma) offers fulcra from which to parse systematic 
decisions underlying e-learning and, most importantly, to find and embrace human values and agency by de-
mystifying both the bounded “self” and the efficacy of online learning. 
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